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 CASE  AND  COMMENT 477
 CORPORATE  CLAIMS AGAINST DIRECTOR FOR PAYING 
BRIBES ON COMPANY’S BEHALF 
 Ho v  Scintronix  
 Introduction 
 Can a company recover the value of the bribe from a director who has paid the bribe, on 
behalf of the company, to a third party to secure certain benefi ts for the company, and 
where it is not alleged that the director had personally benefi ted from the bribe? This 
question raises several complex issues relating to directors’ standard of care, corporate 
authorisation and corporate illegality, which were considered by the recent decision of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in  Ho Kang Peng v  Scintronix Corp (formerly known as TTL 
Holdings) . 1 
 Ho was the chief executive offi cer and executive director of TTL, a Singapore company 
listed on Singapore Exchange. After he stepped down as chief executive offi cer and ceased 
to be a director, TTL brought an action against Ho for causing TTL to enter into a sham 
consultancy agreement (which was effectively an agreement to pay bribes) with, and to 
pay the bribes to, a third party in respect of securing certain businesses for TTL in its 
operations in China. It was not alleged that Ho received any of the bribes. Ho’s defence 
was that the payments were merely a continuation of payments that were previously 
authorised by the board of TTL prior to his joining TTL or, alternatively, the claim was 
barred by  ex turpi causa . The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s fi nding that Ho 
was acting in breach of director’s duties and that the defences did not apply to protect Ho 
in respect of such breach. 
 Standard of care 
 The court found that the consultancy agreement and payments pursuant thereto were 
bribes paid by TTL to a third party in order for TTL to obtain business from an entity 
called Pioneer. Ho was found to be in breach of s.157 of the Singapore’s Companies Act, 2 
which sets out the duty of care of a director to act honestly and use reasonable diligence in 
the discharge of his duties. 3 Ho failed to act honestly or bona fi de in the interests of TTL, 
as the bribes would expose TTL to criminal liability, even if the purported aim of such 
payments was to maximise profi ts for TTL. Ho also failed to use reasonable diligence 
in discharging his duties as chief executive offi cer, because, as he admitted, he relied on 
his subordinates and continued the practice of making such payments, without making 
inquiries as to the real purpose of such payments, which were  prima facie irregular and 
suspicious. 
 1 .  [2014] SGCA 22; 3 SLR 329. 
 2 .  Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 rev. edn). 
 3 .  This provision sets out, non-exhaustively, the statutory duty of care of a director. See also  Lim Weng Kee 
 v  PP [2002] SLR(R) 848 (holding that the provision is to be interpreted in light of the common law standard for 
duty of care for directors). 
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 The fi nding that Ho was in breach of his director’s duty to take reasonable care under 
s.157 is not controversial; an executive director who failed to make any inquiries and 
blindly relied on his subordinates would have fallen below the objective standard of care 
expected of directors. 4 By taking the position that he did not know the purpose of the 
payments, Ho could not argue that he gave careful consideration to whether the payments 
of bribes would outweigh the benefi ts to TTL, in the form of procuring the Pioneer business. 
In any event, even if he had given such consideration, it is unlikely that the court would 
have allowed his assessment as to what is in the interests of the company to prevail in the 
case of criminal conduct that was contrary to the bribery laws of the relevant jurisdiction. 
While it was not articulated in the judgment, it appears to have been assumed that the 
relevant criminal law is Chinese criminal law, since the bribes were paid over in China 
for TTL’s Chinese operations. Singapore criminal law would be unlikely to be relevant, 
given that Singapore’s Prevention of Corruption Act, 5 which prohibits giving of bribes, 
has extraterritorial effect only in respect of bribes committed by Singapore “citizens”, and 
companies (such as TTL) would not fall within that provision. 6 
 Causation 
 However, it does not follow automatically that TTL would succeed in its claim for the 
value of the bribe improperly paid away, since TTL would have to show its loss as having 
arisen from the breach. The orthodox view is that the remedy against the careless fi duciary 
or director who failed to take reasonable care (as opposed to a fi duciary who has been 
involved in breach of loyalty) would be equitable compensation that resembles common 
law damages. 7 The causal link between the loss and breach of duty of care will need to 
be shown. 8 In such a case, while the argument was not advanced by Ho’s counsel, could 
Ho, at the stage of assessment of damages, set off the loss, being the value of the bribe, 
against the gain to TTL, in the form of the profi ts from the Pioneer businesses? The court 
held that any benefi t to the company from the bribe is only “short term”, 9 which seemed 
to assume that the costs of the potential exposure of the company to Chinese bribery laws 
would exceed any gain from the Pioneer business, but neither the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal nor the High Court mentioned that there was any evidence led as to the potential 
penalties faced by TTL under Chinese law. 
 To avoid the problem of demonstrating causation in respect of the company’s claim 
based on breach of duty of care, could it be argued that Ho did not have (and could not 
have had) the authority of the company to pay the bribe, 10 and hence should be liable to 
repay the value of the bribe, as having misapplied the company’s assets? While a director 
does not hold assets on trust for the company, such a claim is akin to that of a fi duciary 
 4 .  See  Re Barings Plc (No 5) (2001) 1 BCLC 523;  Ong Chow Hong v  PP [2011] 3 SLR 1093. 
 5 .  Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 rev. edn), s.37. 
 6 .  Ibid , read with Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 rev. edn), s.2 and Constitution of Singapore.  Cf the UK 
Bribery Act 2010, s.12, which has extraterritorial application, covering persons with close connection with the 
UK, including UK incorporated companies. 
 7 .  See  Bristol and West Building Society v  Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 17–18. 
  8 .  See  Target Holdings v  Redferns [1996] AC 421. 
 9 .  [2014] SGCA 22, [37]. 
 10 .  Infra , fn.15 and accompanying text. 
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who misapplies trust property, 11 and the remedy is that of restoration of the trust property, 
where the test of causation is applied differently from that at common law. 12 It is submitted 
that similar diffi culties will arise since, even accepting that the claim is one of breach of 
trust, there remains the question whether Ho can set off the gain to the company (in the 
form of the profi ts from the Pioneer business) against the loss (the value of the bribe), as 
both the gain and loss arguably arise from the same transaction. 13 
 Defences of authorisation and illegality 
 Ho raised two defences in respect of TTL’s claim: fi rst, that TTL had authorised the bribe; 
and, second, illegality. This aspect of the judgment causes some diffi culty. It was held that 
there was no such authorisation by TTL, because there was no formal board or shareholder 
approval and Ho could not rely on the  Bamford v  Bamford 14  principle of implicit approval 
by the board, because he could not prove that all of the board members (including the 
non-executive directors) acquiesced in the agreement and/or payments. However, while 
there is no such formal approval, Ho, as chief executive offi cer, would have the implied, if 
not express authority, to enter into a consultancy agreement on behalf of the company. It 
is not clear why Ho, as an agent, does not have such implied authority unless the court is 
in effect holding that the agreement and/or payments are in respect of bribes and they can 
never be authorised by Ho or any corporate organ of TTL, in the same way as the board 
of a Singapore company can never approve unlawful fi nancial assistance or any form of 
misapplication of company’s funds. 15 
 Counsel for Ho relied on the House of Lords decision in  Stone & Rolls v  Moore 
Stephens 16  in arguing the claim was barred by illegality. In  Stone & Rolls , the majority 
of the House held that the  ex turpi causa rule would prohibit recovery not only where the 
claimant is relying on his own unlawful conduct in the lawsuit but also where the claimant 
is claiming compensation or an indemnity in respect of the adverse consequences of the 
wrongdoing. However, in the latter case, the bar applies only where the wrongdoing is 
personal and not vicarious. Two English cases post- Stone & Rolls illustrate this principle, 
 11 .  Re Lands Allotment Co [1894] 1 Ch 616;  Holland v  HMRC [2010] UKSC 51; [2010] 1 WLR 2793, 
[45–46]. 
 12 .  See  Target Holdings v  Redferns [1996] AC 421, 434;  Youyang v  Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 
196 ALR 482, [63]. For a commentary on  Youyang , see S Elliott and J Edelman, “Target Holdings in Australia” 
(2003) 119 LQR 554. 
 13 .  See  Bartlett v  Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd  ( Nos 1 and 2 ) [1980] Ch 515. See also G Virgo,  The Principles 
of Equity and Trusts (OUP, Oxford, 2012), [18.3.3]. 
 14 .  [1970] Ch 212. 
 15 .  Under the Singapore Companies Act, s.76, a Singapore company (whether public or private) cannot give 
fi nancial assistance to a person to acquire its own shares, subject to very narrow exceptions (including obtaining 
a whitewash waiver) and none of the exceptions would apply here. The prohibition on unlawful assistance 
in the Singapore Companies Act is similar to UK Companies Act 1985, s.151 (which has been amended by 
the UK Companies Act 2006, s.678 to apply only to public companies). Breach of the fi nancial assistance 
provisions is akin to misapplication of funds, attracting strict liability on the part of the directors. See also  Wu 
Yang Construction v  Mao [2008] 2 SLR(R) 350 (Sing CA);  Belmont Finance v  Williams Furniture [1980] 1 
All ER 393;  cf Holland v  HMRC [2010] UKSC 51; [2010] 1 WLR 2793 (Lord Hope setting out the two lines 
of authorities and preferring the view that liability on the part of the directors is strict, as opposed to dependent 
on knowledge). 
 16 .  [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 537; [2009] 1 AC 1391. 
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though they were not cited in  Ho Kang Peng . In  Nayyar v  Denton Wilde Sapte , 17 a bribery 
case, the individual principal could not recover from his allegedly negligent agent the 
bribe that he (the principal) paid to the third party on the ground of  ex turpi causa , 
notwithstanding the fact that the agent owed the principal a duty of care; in that case, the 
individual principal was personally at fault in paying the bribe. In  Safeway Stores Ltd  v 
 Twigger , 18 the company could not recover the penalties and other consequential losses 
from the directors and employees who allegedly caused the company to enter into anti-
competitive agreements in breach of the UK Competition Act 1998 because the company 
admitted that it was personally (and not vicariously) liable for the wrongdoing. 
 The court in  Ho Kang Peng distinguished  Stone & Rolls , on two grounds: fi rst, 
wrongdoing by the director (Ho) should not be attributed to the company where the 
company is the claimant against the director. In this regard,  Bilta (UK) Ltd v  Nazir 
(No 2) 19  was relied on for the proposition that the company is not attributed with 
wrongdoing so as to bar its claim against the fraudulent directors. Second,  Stone & Rolls 
had no application where the company, such as TTL, is publicly listed and is not a one-
man company (with a sole shareholder-cum-director) as in  Stone & Rolls . According to 
the court, the wrongdoing in this case is only vicarious and not personal to TTL. 
 The case illustrates the judicial unease that the court has with adopting the majority 
reasoning in  Stone & Rolls to allow a wrongdoer to escape the consequences of his own 
wrong. To recap, in  Stone & Rolls , Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Lord Brown of 
Eaton-under-Heywood, both in the majority, held that the wrongdoing of the sole director-
cum-shareholder was attributed to the company, which provided a defence to the corporate 
claim against the auditor. 20 The third member of the majority, Lord Phillips of Worth 
Matravers, rested his decision on illegality. 21 
 In  Ho Kang Peng , it was found that neither the board nor the shareholders of TTL 
authorised the company to pay a bribe. TTL was a publicly listed company and some (but 
not all) of the directors were complicit in the payment of the bribe. The court refused to 
attribute the wrongdoing of the complicit directors to the company. The position reached 
by the court is to be contrasted with  Safeway  v  Twigger . In  Safeway  v  Twigger , the English 
Court of Appeal held that the  ex turpi causa rule applied not only where the board or the 
shareholders approved the illegal action; the rule could also apply if, on the construction 
of the applicable legislation, the wrongdoing was personal and not only vicarious to the 
company. Hence, even though  Safeway v  Twigger did not concern a one-man company, the 
illegality defence was held to bar the company’s claim on the ground that the wrongdoing 
(the contravention of the relevant provisions of the Competition Act 1998) was personal 
to the company. 
 The distinction between personal and vicarious liability in the context of the illegality 
defence has been criticised by academic commentators. 22 It is not clear whether the court 
 17 .  [2009] EWHC 3218 (QB); [2010] PNLR 15. 
 18 .  [2010] EWCA Civ 1472; [2011] Bus LR 1629; [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 462. 
 19 .  [2013] EWCA Civ 968; [2014] Ch 52. 
 20 .  [2009] 1 AC 1391, [133–136] (Lord Walker); [197–201] (Lord Brown). 
 21 .  Ibid , [51–56]. 
 22 .  See eg P Watts, “Illegality and Agency Law: Authorising Illegal Action” [2011] JBL 213; E Lim, “The 
Illegality Defence and Company Law” (2013) 13 JCLS 49. 
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in  Ho Kang Peng will reach a different conclusion if the members of the board were found 
to have known but yet authorised the payment of the bribe. It could be argued that there 
are good policy reasons against such recovery in such a case. Another way to look at the 
issue is that the payment of a bribe is not a transaction that any director of the company can 
ever approve. Hence, the payment of a bribe will always be an unauthorised transaction 
of the company. 
 Ultimately, the outcome of  Ho Kang Peng can be justifi ed on prophylactic grounds. 
Bribery involves such moral turpitude that the courts should be slow to allow a corrupt 
director to raise the defence of  ex turpi causa in respect of a civil claim from the company, 
even if the director had carried out the bribery ostensibly for the benefi t of the company. 
The challenge is determining the principled basis for the cause of action. 
 Wai Yee Wan* 
 MITIGATION, CAUSATION AND  POLICY 
 The New Flamenco 
 One of the principles of mitigation of damages in contract is that, where a claimant takes 
steps which have the effect of mitigating the loss to him, consequent upon the defendant’s 
breach, the damages are reduced commensurately. The issue in  The New Flamenco 1  was 
the relationship required between the steps and the breach, and the role of public policy, in 
determining which steps count. Though the case arose from a breach of contract, many of 
the authorities cited concern tort actions, and there is no suggestion that the principles are 
different, as between contract and tort. 2 
 Facts and issues in brief 
 The  New Flamenco was a cruise ship on a time charterparty, which was eventually 
extended (by oral agreement) until November 2009. The charterers disputed the validity 
of the oral extension, and indicated that they would redeliver the vessel in October 2007, 
the date that would have been applicable had there been no oral extension. The owners 
treated the charterers’ notice as an anticipatory breach, which they accepted as terminating 
the charterparty. They then sold the vessel, for a little under US$24 million. 3 
 The owners commenced arbitration proceedings, claiming “damages calculated by 
reference to the net loss of profi ts which they alleged that they would have earned during 
the additional two year extension”. 4 (Presumably, had there been suitable time charter 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
1 . Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel SAU (The New Flamenco) [2014] EWHC 1547 
(Comm); [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 230.
2 . Indeed, they were expressly equated in Bellingham v Dhillon [1973] 1 QB 304, 309, cited [2014] EWHC 
1547 (Comm), [37].
3 . [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm), [5–6].
4 . [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm), [8].
